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CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATIONS IN
WISCONSIN-PART 11*
By GORDON B. BALDWIN**
943.21 FRAUD ON HOTEL OR RESTAURANT KEEPER
This section deals with the misappropriation of certain kinds of ser-
vices. The actor must abscond without paying for the food, lodging or
other service. "Abscond" in this sense means to depart clandestinely.175
A person absconds if he departs without the knowledge or consent of
the operator of the hotel, motel, boarding or lodging house, or restau-
rant.1 76 If the person who furnished the service or other accommoda-
tion consents to the actor's leaving without paying, (for example, where
he extends credit) no offense is committed.
The actor must intentionally abscond without paying, i.e., he must
know that he has not paid and that credit has not been extended by the
person furnishing the services or accommodations. Someone who ab-
sent-mindedly walks out of a restaurant without paying is not punished
by this section. Curiously the statute does not apply to the man who
with an intent to defraud remains on the premises and does not ab-
scond.
943.21 is a restatement of part of section 343.402 entitled Fraud on
innkeeper. Subsection (1) of the old section proscribed obtaining lodg-
ing or other service at a hotel, inn, or boarding or lodging house; the
new section includes motels as well. Specifically the old subsection
covered: (1) The obtaining of lodging without paying unless credit
was expressly given; such conduct is not absconding, (2) The obtain-
ing of credit by a false show of baggage or other misrepresentation;
but in practice if such a person actually paid his bill upon leaving he
would not be prosecuted, so the new section is limited to cases where
he does not pay, (3) Absconding without paying, (4) Defrauding the
proprietor in any other way while a guest at his place. The latter con-
duct is covered by the general section of theft, 943.20.
Subsection (2) of the old law provided that the return unpaid of
any check or other order for the payment of money given to pay for
lodging or other service was prima facie evidence of an intent to de-
fraud. This was dropped because the person giving the worthless
* This is the second and last part of this article. The first part appeared in Vol.
44, Winter, 1960-61, No. 3 of the Marquette Law Review.
** Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School,
A.B. 1950, Haverford College, L.L.B. 1953, The Cornell Law School.
175 WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY (2d ed.).
17B A lodging house has been said to include a house in which furnished rooms
were rented to three or more persons at a stipulated rental per week, and
services were supplied to keep the rooms in orderly condition. 15 Op. Atty.
Gen. 114.
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check or other order is covered by the new section on worthless checks
(943.24) which contains a prima facie evidence provision.
Susection (3) was very similar to subsection (1) except that it
applied to obtaining food at restaurants.
943.22 USE OF CHEATING TOKENS
This section also deals with obtaining property or services but is
restricted to the use of certain means. It replaces part of 343.341 which
punished persons who placed or deposited any "token, slug, false or
counterfeited coin, device . . . with intent to cheat or defraud. .. ."
The new section accomplishes the same purpose with much simpler and
revealing language. Nothing in the legislative history of this section
indicates that a substantive change in the law was intended, although
the language expressing the mental element has been revised. The old
law established a prima facie case of intent to defraud where a slug
was used to obtain services. The present law merely requires that the
state show that the defendant knew he was not depositing lawful money
or an authorized token.17 7 The jury, of course, may infer the requisite
mental element from their consideration of all the surrounding circum-
stances.
943.23 OPERATING VEHICLE WITHOUT OWNER'S CONSENT
A. General Comments
Common law larceny, as well as theft under 943.20(1), paragraphs
(a) and (c), requires proof that the actor intended to deprive the
owner "permanently of possession." 178 Consequently, where the actor
takes the property under circumstances indicating merely an intention
to use temporarily, criminal liability does not obtain unless it can be
shown that the actor disposed of the property in a manner that amounted
to a reckless exposure to loss, in which case a jury might properly infer
an intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession. In many
situations, however, the jury can not properly find such an intention.
To meet the problem created by the actor who "borrows" or otherwise
uses valuable property without the consent of the owner and without an
intent to deprive the owner permanently, specific criminal statutes are
required. Statutes dealing with such temporary use of automobiles and
other vehicles are commonly referred to as proscribing "joy-riding."
943.23 makes two important changes in the old section which result
in a broader scope to the law.'7 9 First, the statute is no longer restricted
177 The Proposed Code in 343.21(1), listed as prima facie evidence of stealing:
"Obtaining property of another or services of a public utility by depositing
anything except lawful money or authorized tokens in any receptacle used for
the deposit of such coins or tokens; ... "
178 The Proposed Code's treatment of stealing (343.20) would merely have re-
quired an intentional use.
179 WIs. STAT. §343.18 (1953). Operation of Motor Vehicles Without Owner's
Consent.
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to the operation of devices on the "public" highway ;18o the act may take
place anywhere within the jurisdiction of the state.181 Second, the sta-
tute is no longer restricted to "motor vehicles."
B. Vehicles
"Vehicle" is defined in the criminal code as "any self-propelled de-
vice for moving persons or property or pulling implements from one
place to another, whether such device is operated on land, rails, water
or in the air."'1 8 2 A "self-propelled device" could, without undue strain,
be construed to refer to animals as well as the more modern forms of
transportation such as automobiles, motorboats, airplanes locomotives,
etc. However, the definition is not without its problems. Are such
devices as bicycles, sailboats and iceboats within the purview of this
section? Authoritative answers must await decision of the courts. A
limitation on the kind of "vehicle" intended may be implied by the use
of the word "drive" in referring to the act of misappropriation. One
"drives" an automobile, a team of horses, or perhaps a locomotive, but
airplanes were intended to be included, and one does not "drive" them.
Moreover, it seems hardly correct to say that the horseback rider
"drives" his mount, or that a sailor "drives" his sailboat. An answer
to these riddles may be supplied by an analysis of the essential problem
which is whether the temporary misappropriation proscribed by this
section is deemed so serious that the criminal law should attach sanc-
tions. The elimination of the word "motor" in the new statute indicates
that the device does not automatically exclude reference to horses,
gliders, sailboats, iceboats, and less conventional means of transporta-
tion.
C. Requisite Act
The statute applies to whomever "takes and drives" any vehicle.
"Takes and drives" was used in preference to the phrase "intentionally
operates" in the Proposed Code. The word "operates" might be applied
to a mere starting of the motor and it was for that reason that the
Model Penal Code rejected its use in preference to "takes."'18 3 Evi-
dently it was believed that conduct merely tentatively indicating an in-
tention to drive the vehicle should not be covered.
D. Without Consent
The consent of the owner to the use of the vehicle is a defense under
180 Schroeder v. State, 222 Wis. 251, 267 N.W. 899 (1936).
181 See Wis. STAT. §939.03 (1959).
182 The Model Penal Code defines "vehicle" as "any device for transportation by
land, water or air, including mobile equipment with provision for transport
of an operator, and draught or riding animals." MODEL PENAL CODE §206.6(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 4). The varying constructions given to the work are set
forth in standard law dictionaries. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, 1724 (4th
ed. 1951).
183 See MODEL PENAL CODE §206.6(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2) and MODEL PENAL
CODE §206.6(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4).
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this section, as under the prior law.184 In State v. Mularkey,85 the de-
fendant hired an automobile for a short trip, but in violation of the
agreement the auto was taken on a further journey and then abandoned.
The extra driving was without the consent, permission or knowledge of
the owner. The Supreme Court held that the extra driving did not result
in a violation of the joy-riding statute stating: "the mere unauthorized
or extended use of such a vehicle by one who has lawfully obtained the
consent of the owner to its taking or use ... is not a violation of this
statute .... 186 The Court indicated that the substance of the offense is
the "obtaining of the possession in the first instance without the consent
of the owner."' 8 7 The evident reason for this holding as well as others
like it is that courts are reluctant to chart a course which would make
criminal an ordinary breach of contract. s88 The owner who lets his au-
tomobile for hire must assume some risk that the terms of the hire may
be broken. The owner has a civil remedy which in a proper case might
even be in conversion for the value of the car.
E. Relation to the Crime of Larceny
Under the prior statute an acquittal for larceny did not preclude a
trial and conviction for joy-riding because an essential element of the
crime-operation on a public highway-was not required for larceny.
Each of the crimes was a distinct statutory offense.8 9 This result should
no longer obtain. Information which might lead to a conviction for
larceny is sufficient to sustain a conviction under 943.23 if the jury
does not find an intent to deprive the owner permanently. The line be-
tween 943.20 and 943.23 may be a close one, but it is one which a jury
might with proper instruction be able to determine.
The language adopted in 943.23 is similar to that finally adopted
in the Theft statute and leads to the conclusion that something in the
nature of a trespassory act is required. The requirement that the de-
fendant "drive" the vehicle implies the need for some kind of move-
ment, perhaps merely a turning of the wheel.
943.24 ISSUE OF WORTHLESS CHECK
A. General Comments
Special legislation has traditionally been enacted to deal with bad
checks because they involved a promise to perform in the future, and
this was, under the old dogma, not a false representation: a check was
184 See definition for "without consent" in §939.22(48) (1959).
185 195 Wis. 549,218 N.W. 809 (1928).
1 86 Id at 551, 218 N.W. at 810.
187 Ibid; accord, People v. Alaboda, 198 App. Div. 41, 189 N.Y. Supp. 464 (1921);
State v. Boggs, 181 Iowa 358, 164 N.W. 759 (1917).
Iss Eastway v. State, 189 Wis. 56, 206 N.W. 879 (1926).
189 Schroeder v. State, 222 Wis. 251, 267 N.W. 899 (1936) ; State v. Mularkey,
supra note 185.
19611
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
no more than the drawer's promise that the bank would pay.'9 ° On the
facts this, of course, is absurd, for the giving of the check is in normal
usage a representation of fact that there are or will be funds to back
it. 191
This section covers persons who, at the time they issue a check or
other order for the payment of money, intend that it shall not be paid.
The important element of intent in 943.24 differs from the prior law 92
which required that the actor have knowledge that he did not have suffi-
cient funds in or credit with the bank or other depository on which the
check or order was drawn. Under the present statute a person who
writes a check with sufficient funds in the bank but with intent to stop
payment on the check is guilty of the same kind of conduct as the person
who writes a check without funds. Of course, the fact that the actor did
not have sufficient funds is persuasive evidence that he intended the
check should not be paid and accordingly this is deemed prima facie
evidence of the requisite intent.
93
B. Requisite Act
The statute applies to one who "issues" a worthless check. "Issue"
has been substituted for the phrase "shall make or draw, or utter or
deliver" because it simplifies the language and proscribes the desired
activity. The word has a well-defined meaning in the law of negotiable
instruments: the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to
a person who takes it as a holder.1 4 It would appear that the second
delivery of a worthless check would not be covered. This deficiency
could be corrected by the addition of the phrase "or passes" as was done
in the Model Penal Code.' 99
C. Checks Not Covered
As stated in subsection (3) two types of checks are not included:
(a) a check given for past consideration except a payroll check, and
(b) a postdated check. Payroll checks were included because after some
debate in the Criminal Code Advisory Committee it was noted that
they have created some problem in metropolitan areas. Payroll checks
are given for past consideration but are treated as exceptions because
of the special reliance placed upon them.
A check given to release a lien is not given for past consideration,
although the services giving rise to the lien were performed before the
check was issued. Thus a person giving a worthless check to an auto-
g0 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 269-270 (1952); CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF
CRIMES 824-825 (6th ed. 1958).
"9' State v. Foxton, 166 Iowa 181, 147 N.W. 347 (1914).
'92 WIS. STAT. §343.401 (1953), Issue of Worthless Check.
193 WIs. STAT. §943.24(2) (1959).
194 WIS. STAT. §116.01(10) (1959). See Merkel v. State, 167 Wis. 512, 167 N.W.
802 (1918) decided under the prior statute.
295 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.22 (Tent. Draft No. 4).
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mobile repair shop and who receives the car at that time is covered by
this section.
Postdated checks are not included in this section, because it has been
the custom of merchants in some areas to encourage the giving of post-
dated checks when the customer does not have sufficient funds on hand
to pay for the purchase. Furthermore, postdated checks are sometimes
received as a means of encouraging the payment of debts. 96 The person
who takes a postdated check should be on notice that there may not be
sufficient funds in the account of the issuer.
An issue that remains debatable is whether the section applies to a
person who knowingly issues a worthless check as a gift. The prior
law required "an intent to defraud," but this is no longer a requisite.
One who issues such a bad check, although not cheating the recipient,
knows that the check will be negotiated for cash, credit or property, and
that improper bank credits are made.' 9 7 The proscription of this result
may be within the objective of the criminal law.
The issuer of such a check must realize that reliance will be placed
upon it. Because the penalty for the violation of this statute is relatively
light, no great hardship is encountered by this construction. A number
of courts have held that the defendant need not obtain anything of value
in order to be convicted under similar statutes.198
943.25 TRANSFER OF ENCUMBERED PROPERTY
A. General Comments
This section embodies a restatement of two old sections,19 9 and repre-
sents a considerable revision of the Proposed Code.200 It adds two per-
tinent features to the Proposed Code: first, the 72 hour notice provision
296 No Wisconsin cases have been discovered. See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 1159
(1958) : Construction and effect of "bad check" statute with respect to check
in payment of pre-existing debt.
197 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.22, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2).
198 People v. Khan, 41 Cal. App. 393, 182 Pac. 803 (1919) ; People v. Freedman,
111 Cal. App. 2d 611, 245 P. 2d 45 (1952) ; State v. Lowenstein, 393 Ohio St.
142 N.E. 897 (1924) ; State v. Meeks, 30 Ariz. 436, 247 Pac. 1099 (1926) ; for
contra cases see 59 A.L.R. 2d at 1161 (1958).
199 Wis. STAT. §343.321 (1953), and Wis. STAT. §343.69 (1953), sale of mortgaged
property.
200 Proposed Code, 343.25 (1953):
Transfer of Incumbered Property. (1) Any person in possession of
property in which another has a security interest, who, with intent to
defraud, conceals, removes or transfers it may be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both.
(2) If the security interest was created in personal property, it is prima
facie evidence of an intent to defraud if the actor, with knowledge that
the security interest exists, removes or transfers the property by sale
or gift or for security purposes without the consent of the holder of
the security interest or without authorization by law or by the agree-
ment creating the security interest.
(3) In this section "security interest" means an interest in property
which secures payment or other performance of an obligation. Examples
are mortgages and conditional sales contracts.
1961]
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in referring to prima facie evidence, and second, it permits a person to
place an additional mortgage on a chattel without the consent of the first
mortgagee or without giving him notice. The present section is designed
to protect the interest of the innocent purchaser as well as the holder of
the encumbrance or security interest. The innocent purchaser is on con-
structive notice of any lien filed on the property. The existence of a
recorded lien may be evidence that the defendant did not "intend to
defraud," but it should not by itself insulate the defendant from criminal
liability. "Security interest" is defined broadly to include an interest in
property which secures payment or other performance of an obligation.
Hence it includes mortgages, conditional sales contracts, trust receipts
and liens. An attorney general's opinion rendered under the prior law
stated that the interest should be an enforceable one,20 1 but it is difficult
to find a rational reason for such a limitation because the important ele-
ment in this crime is whether the defendant intended to defraud another.
Prosecution for this offense may take place in a county where the
lien was filed, or where the transfer took place, or in the county from
which the property was removed with intent to defraud.202
B. Intent to Defraud
"Intent to defraud" requires actual knowledge that another has a
security interest in the property. 0 3 An innocent purchaser with only
constructive knowledge of an encumbrance or security interest on the
property (the interest is recorded for example) would not have an "in-
tent to defraud," if he removed or transferred the property in violation
of the terms of the encumbrance or security interest.204 "Intent to de-
fraud" is here used in the sense of an intent to cause pecuniary loss,
either to the person whose encumbrance or security interest is en-
dangered or defeated, or to the innocent purchaser who has, at best,
only constructive notice of the security interest or encumbrance. 20 5
A 1919 opinion of the Attorney General concluded that no "intent
to defraud" could be found under the predecessor statute in a case in
which the mortgagor of an automobile, without consent of the mortgagee,
removed the engine and crank shaft to have them repaired. The cost of
repairs was some hundred dollars more than estimated and the mort-
gagor could not make the payment. No intend to defraud, said the At-
torney General, was disclosed by these circumstances. The mortgagee
could pay the bill himself to secure his property. 0 6
201 Op. Atty. Gen. 105, 107 (1937). Contra, MODEL PENAL CODE §206.2 (Tent.
Draft No. 4).
202 WIs. STAT. §956.01(12) (1959).
203 The phrase "intent to defraud" varies with the content in which it is used.
See United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (1943) ; United States v. Cohn,
270 U.S. 339 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481 (1874).
204 Cf., Porter v. Burtis, 197 Wis. 227, 221 N.W. 741 (1928).
205 In protecting the innocent purchaser the statute may be broader than the pre-
existing law. See 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 105 (1937).
206 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 832 (1919).
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C. Application to Persons
The statute applies generally to persons who commit certain acts
upon encumbered property or a security interest. It is not restricted
so as to apply only to mortgagees who dispose of encumbered property.
The Proposed Code applied to "any person in possession," but this lim-
itation does not obtain in the present statute.20 7
It is not essential that the defendant have a legal interest in the
property involved. In State v. Hunkins, 208 the defendant conveyed rec-
ord title to certain real estate to his mother who held the property in
trust. An encumbrance existed on the property, although it was not
recorded. At the request of the defendant the property was conveyed by
his mother to innocent purchasers who paid full value to the defendant.
The purchasers were not informed of the encumbrance by the defendant,
who then hurried to the office of the register of deeds and placed the prior
mortgage on record a few minutes before the grantees put their new
deed upon record. Upon being prosecuted for a violation of a predeces-
sor statute,20 9 the defendant contended that the statute covered only the
person who "executes" the conveyance. The court denied the plea on
the ground that the conveyor was acting in the capacity of an agent.
This construction was reached, however, as a device for rejecting the
defendant's argument that the statute did not proscribe his fraud. If
the defendant's argument is accepted, said the court:
[the] construction emasculates the statute, and makes its evasion
ridiculously easy. All that the fraudulent vendor has to do is to
place the title in the name of an innocent party and have him
make the conveyance, and by this means the act which, if done by
his own hand, would be criminal, has become purged of all crimin-
ality because done at his direction by the hand of an innocent tool.
The law is scarcely as helpless as this.
210
In accord with the Hunkins decision is a 1932 opinion of the At-
torney General. In this instance the encumbered property was owned
by a corporation, the stock of which was almost entirely owned by its
president. The president conducted a sale of the encumbered corporate
property, deposited the funds received to the credit of the company, and
subsequently transferred them to his personal account. On these facts
the Attorney General concluded there could be criminal liability.211
"Persons in possession" is a broad description, for it includes not
only the debtor or his assigns but also his personal representatives or
207 Proposed Code 34325(1) (1953).
20290 Wis. 264, 62 N.W. 1047, 63 N.W. 167 (1895).
209Ch. 244, Laws of 1887 (S & B ANN. STAT. §4431(a)).210oSupra note 208, at 267-268, 62 N.W. at 1048.
21121 Op. Atty. Gen. 108 (1932), citing Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W.
252 (1909) as authority for disregarding the corporate entity. See also Kralo-
vetz v. State, 191 Wis. 374, 211 N.W. 277 (1926) and Weber v. State, 190 Wis.
257, 208 N.W. 923 (1926).
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his heirs. The scope of the present statute is broader, for these people
remain within its purview together with persons who have no legal in-
terest in the property involved. An overlap with the theft statute, there-
fore, may exist. The thief who takes and disposes of an automobile on
which he knows there is a chattel mortgage may thus commit theft under
943.20 and a violation of 943.25. 212
D. 943.25 (2) (a) A Prima Facie Case
The prima facie evidence provision operates only when the security
interest was created in personal property. Real property is excluded
because it is not uncommon practice to transfer land without giving
notice to the holder of the encumbrance, for he is usually protected by
the registration provisions applicable to real property. A proper defini-
tion of "personal property" may offer some difficulty because of the
question whether it includes personal property which later becomes af-
fixed to real estate. If the subject matter is real property the misap-
propriation becomes subject to the provisions of 943.25(1). Otherwise
the problem is simply did the defendant intend to defraud, and the prima
facie provision offers one method of showing an intent to defraud. The
prima facie evidence provision will cause confusion unless it is clearly
understood that its provisions are not conditions precedent to the com-
mission of the crime. Prima facie evidence means that there is such a
relation between the facts constituting prima facie evidence and the
prohibited conduct, that proof of those facts creates an inference that
the actor was guilty of the prohibited conduct. The jury is required to
consider the prima facie evidence along with other evidence in deter-
mining whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt.212
The removal or sale of the property is not prima facie evidence
if it is made with the consent of the holder of the security interest or
with authorization of law or by the agreement creating the security
interest. The consent of the holder of the security interest may be oral,
whereas under the prior law it had to be in writing.214 "Authorization
by law" refers to situations such as that provided in the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act which allows the temporary removal, for not more than
30 days, of property held under a conditional sales contract.215 "Agree-
ment creating the security interest" refers to arrangements commonly
212 Wis. STAT. §939.71 (1959), ". . . a conviction or acquittal on the merits under
one provision bars a subsequent prosecution under the other provision unless
each provision requires proof of a fact for conviction which the other does
not require." (Italics Added) Theft under §943.20(1) (a) requires proof of
"intent to deprive owner permanently" while §943.25 requires proof of "intent
to defraud." §943.25 requires the state to show the actor's knowledge of a
security interest, while to prove theft no such knowledge need be shown.
213 Spaulding v. Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Co., 33 Wis. 582 (1873).2 14 WIS. STAT. §343.69 (1953). See also 35 Op. Atty. Gen. 364 (1946).
215 WIs. STAT. §122.13 (1959).
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included in chattel mortgages on stock in trade which contemplates the
sale of the goods. The 72 hours provision was in part retained from the
prior statute.
943.26 REMOVING OR DAMAGING ENCUMBERED REAL PROPERTY 2 6
Whereas 943.25(2) (a) deals with personal property, 943.26 con-
cerns real property. The statute proscribes only conduct by mortgagors
or vendees under a land contract who intentionally do any act which
substantially impairs the security interest.
For example, the vendee of a residence under a land contract who
intentionally 2 7 cuts down a valuable shade tree reduces the value of the
property. If the act was done without the consent of the vendor the actor
will violate this section. 218
943.30 THREATS TO INJURE OR ACCUSE OF CRIME
A. General Comments
This section concerns matters within the ambit of common law ex-
tortion and blackmail.219 Coercion, rather than deception, characterizes
this offense. It is one of the few provisions in the Criminal Code taken
almost verbatim from the prior law, and its only substantive change is in
the increased maximum penalty.220 Conforming with the general pattern
of the Criminal Code, a minimum penalty is no longer specified.
The inability of the Criminal Code Advisory Committee to agree on
a change means that problems will continue which formerly vexed the
common law of extortion such as the meaning of "malice" and "intent
to extort." One reason given for the rejection of the Proposed Code's
provision was the belief that it might in some unknown way engender
new controversies in the field of employment relations where a federal
statute already occupies an important place.221 The majority felt that any
change, even to effect a restatement of the law, should best be left for
special legislative treatment. In view of the defense of mistake of
law,222 neither the Proposed Code nor the present statute should con-
stitute a real threat to labor unions' legitimate interests.
The Proposed Code's provisions remain of considerable value, as
they describe in simpler terms the kind of behavior which was deemed
216 This section is based on Ch. 143 §9 of Wis. Laws 1955, which created a new
section, §343.315 which was slightly modified and adopted into the Criminal
Code.
217 Defined in Wis. STAT. §939.23(3) (1959).
218 "Without consent" is defined in §939.22 (48).
219 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 319 (1952); CLARx & MARSHAL, CRIMvrES 794 (6th
ed. 1958).
220 See Wis. STAT. §340.45 (1953) Threats to Accuse of Crime or Injure; based
upon REv. STAT. ch. 133 §38 (1849) ; REv. STAT. ch. 164 §38 (1858) ; REv. STAT.
§4380 (1878); Wis. STAT. ch. 243 (1887); Wis. ANN. STAT. §4380 (1889);
Wis. STAT. §4380 (1898) ; and Wis. STAT. §340.45 (1925).
221 The FEDERAL ANTI-RACKETERING AcT, which in some cases will overlap with
the WISCONSIN CRIMINAL CoDE, is found at 18 U.S.C. 1951.
222 WIs. STAT. §939.43 (1959).
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to be within the purview of this section and 943.31 of the Criminal
Code.223
B. The Act.
The crime defined in 943.30 usually involves a type of attempted
misappropriation. Hence there need be no actual transfer or other act
of misappropriation. 22 4 The crime consists of a threat coupled with an
intent to induce the transfer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in language
which accords with the common law, has stated: "The gist of the offense
described in the statute is the attempt to extort money .... If the threat
be of the kind referred to in the statute, and is made with the intent
thereby to extort money, or with the intent to accomplish any of the other
objects mentioned therein, the crime has been committed. 2 5
This is not a complete analysis for the crime is also committed when
the threat is to induce another to do an act against his will. In State v.
Cornpton,228 a threat was made to induce the victims to abandon their
business and leave town. This was held to be sufficient to constitute a
violation of the statute.
Reduced to its essentials, the statute proscribes two kinds of con-
duct: (1) the obtaining of something to which the actor is not entitled
by threatening his victim, and (2) the obtaining of property to which
the actor may be entitled by means of methods deemed objectionable.
The objectionable method of this latter instance may be a failure to do
something. For example X, who has been defrauded by Y, threatens Y
that unless a certain sum is repaid X will seriously injure Y and will
accuse Y of committing a crime. X has a clear right to the damages, but
the threat may amount to such a danger to the community's tranquility
that it should be deemed criminal conduct in order to preserve the pub-
lic peace as well as to deter others from doing the same thing. How-
ever, when X threatens to accuse Y of a crime, X is fulfilling a public
duty. Whether or not this should be the basis of a criminal act should
depend on whether the threat is accompanied by the implication that the
payment of money will keep X quiet. It is the law's intention that crime
be punished and that persons with knowledge of a crime aid in the en-
forcement of the law. X's failure to act contravenes this basic purpose.
223 The Proposed Code would have provided: "34326 Extortion. Whoever makes
any of the following threats with intent to induce the threatened person against
his will to transfer to the actor or another property to which the actor knows
he or such other person is not legally entitled may be fined not more than
$2,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both. .. "
224 O'Neil v. State, 237 Wis. 391, 403, 296 N.W. 96 (1941), citing Commonwealth
v. Corcoran, 252 Mass. 465, 483, 148 N.E. 123, 127 (1925) ; People v. Thompson,
97 N.Y. 313 (1884).
223 O'Neill v. State, supra note 224.
226 77 Wis. 460, 46 N.W. 535 (1890). The defendant sent a letter to two ladies
stating "If you do not leave this city inside 10 days you will be tarred and
feathered, now we 'mean' it from the lovers of decent 'Citizens.' You are
counted a nusants (sic.) by all." This gentle invitation was held criminal.
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1. Kinds of threats
a) Threat to accuse another of any crime or offense.
It is of course desirable that crimes should not go unpunished and ac-
cordingly, the law must not discourage the prosecution of criminals. A
person threatening to accuse another of the commission of a crime may
be threatening to do what is really a public duty. Nevertheless almost
every extortion statute punishes one who threatens to accuse another of a
crime. In O'Neill v. State,227 a conviction of extortion was affirmed as
the defendants were found to have threatened to accuse their victim of
criminal libel. The Attorney General took the position, in an old opinion,
that the statute is violated when there is a threat to "prosecute" but not
where there is merely a threat to "accuse." 22 It is hard to see the real
significance of this distinction if in both cases there is an intent to mis-
appropriate the property of another. The distinction may have been
made, however, as a check against the possibility of convicting a person
who threatens merely to inform the law enforcement authorities of a
possible criminal act. Such a person is presumably fulfilling his public
duty, while the person who threatens to prosecute evinces a more defi-
nite intent to misappropriate. The real question is always whether an
unlawful attempt to secure the property of another has been made. The
suggested distinction does not direct itself at that question. The dis-
tinction is rebutted by the words of the statute as well as by language
of the O'Neill case,2 ° and in State v. McDonald,230 although some am-
biguity persists in these decisions.
The defendant may be convicted although the threat to accuse an-
other of a crime is not couched in precise language. It is sufficient if
the threat is in "language approximating a legal definition of the crime
of which accusation is threatened." 23' If the threat is ambiguous or of
uncertain meaning, innuendoes declaring this purpose and meaning may
be properly considered.2
32
The statute does not require that the threatened harm be unlawful.
The actor may have the right or the duty to accuse another of the crime,
but if he employs threats to secure property to which he is not entitled
the statute should apply. Accordingly, the policeman who is obliged to
227Supra note 224.
2?8 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 423 (1924). This distinction was made by the Municipal
Court of Milwaukee in Schultz v. State, 135 Wis. 644, 649, 114 N.W. 505, 506(1908), but the Supreme Court did not pass on the propriety of the charge.
229Supra note 224, at 398-399, although the court's opinion uses "accuse" and
"prosecute" somewhat indiscriminately.
230 192 Wis. 612, 618, 213 N.W. 295, 297 (1927). Here again the language of the
opinion makes indiscriminate use of the words "accuse" and "prosecute."
231 Id. at 617,213 N.W. at 297.
232 Id. at 618, 213 N.W. at 297 (dictum) ; Commonwealth v. Nathan, 93 Pa. Super.
193 (1928).
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arrest would be unfaithful to his trust if he did not act, and he would
violate 943.30 if he required the arrestee to pay money to avoid arrest.233
b) Threat to do any injury.
Two major distinctions exist between a violation of 943.30 and
943.32, entitled Robbery. First, in robbery the defendant has actually
taken property from another. Second, the taking in the robbery situation
is under circumstances involving the actual use of force or "threat of im-
minent force" against a person. The danger to the victim in the extortion
situation is more remote. Hence the distinction between the two crimes
is verbally certain although in some cases the difference in fact can be
very small.
Courts have sometimes encountered some difficulty in determining
whether or not the threat was to do "injury." In Schultz v. State,23 4
the defendant, a newspaper reporter, threatened to "expose" the fact
that this complainant, a member of the county board of supervisors, had
made a "corrupt agreement," unless he was paid fifty dollars. The jury
convicted the defendant on the ground that this constituted a "threat to
do injury to the person, business or calling" of the complainant, but the
Supreme Court reversed stating, "we think it clear that it [the statute]
was not intended to cover injury by reputation .... ,,23- An injury, said
the Court, means "physical injury," and the defendant's act was not di-
rected toward the accomplishment of this object. On the other hand, in
Mayer v. State,236 a conviction was sustained where the defendant threat-
ened to call a strike unless his victim paid him $200. This, said the court,
was a threat to do injury to business within the terms of the statute.
"The disasterous effect of a strike upon a business is too well known to
require any effort to establish its ill effects. It is almost bound to result in
the interruption of business, with loss and confusion affecting with dis-
aster, to a considerable extent, the business assailed. ' ' 237
A threat by a person that unless the recipient pays, the sender "will
take it out of his hide" constitutes a violation of this section, 231 accord-
ing to an opinion of the Attorney General. The facts revealed a cor-
respondence from the actor disclosing an attempt to collect a $2.13
233 See MODEL PENAL CODE §206.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2); State v.
Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225, 73 A.L.R. 380 (1930).
234 Supra note 228.
235 Id. at 650, 114 N.W. at 507. Supra note 228 at 650. The jury did not consider
whether the acts charged constituted a "threat to accuse of a crime." The
behavior under question in the Schultz case may now be treated under §943.31.
236 222 Wis. 34, 267 N.W. 290 (1936) ; accord, United States v. Compagna, 146 F.
2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944).
237id. at 37, 267 N.W. at 291; accord, 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 466 (1925). Persons
wearing masks and robes entered a restaurant and informed the owner that
she must "clean up . . . and run this place respectable .... Unless you obey
our orders we are going to . . . ship you straight back to England." This, in
the opinion of the Attorney General was a threat to injure the business.
238 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 972 (1915).
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debt.2 3 9 Two of the letters contained the ominous threat to "take it out
of your hide." The opinion may mark the Plimsoll line between an hon-
est attempt to collect a just debt, and a criminal offense.
Relatively few cases have arisen under the Wisconsin statute hence
the courts will be required to analyze the functions of the statute to
determine its meaning. The intention of the legislature would surely not
be thwarted by construing 943.30 to proscribe such threats as the threat
of a professor to flunk a student unless certains sums were paid (injury
to business or calling), or a threat by employer to pay in order to avoid
dismissal from employment.2 4
c) The person threatened.
It is not required that the threat be to injure the person from whom
the property, advantage or other actions is demanded. For example, the
statute is violated when the defendant threatens to harm a child unless
its father pays a sum of money. Moreover the threat can be to do harm
to anyone, and is not restricted to one who bears a special relationship
with the intended victim.
C. The Mental Element.
The mental element required for a conviction under this statute is
expressed in vague and general terms; "any person who shall maliciously
threaten ... with intent ... to compel the person so threatened to do
any act against his will. . . ." "Maliciously" in this sense simply means
without any elements of justification or mitigation.2 4 1 Some confusion
239 The correspondence supplies a good example of how not to write collection
letters. The letters read as follows:
June 15. 1915
Dear Sir:
We received your money order for $2 and have applied it to your slow
account. I suppose you think this will fix up or fix it up for at least a
while. I wish you were here-you good for nothing-I would learn you
that your lies wouldn't go with me. If you pay the other $2.13 in a
few days-all right-I will wait, but I will fix you plenty if you don't.
August 16, 1915Dear Sir:
Do you know you are owing us a bill of $2.13 that you had ought to
have paid a long time ago? You wooden headed good for nothing liar.
I will take this out of your hide if you don't pay it pretty soon.
September 8, 1915
Dear Sir:
Do you know you are owing us $2.13 since Dec. 19th, old sleepy David?
I would like to get my eye on you. I will fix you a plenty you good for
nothing. September 22, 1915
Dear Sir:
Old sleepy nothing you are owing us bill here of $2.13. Why don't you
pay it? Wait until I see you. I will take it out of your hide with some
interest along with it.
240 Held to be a property interest; see State v. Vallee, 136 Me. 432, 12 A. 2d 421(1940). Contra, In re McCabe 29 Mont. 28, 73 Pac. 1106 (1903).
241 See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 679 (1952) : "The malice required . .. is not a
feeling of ill will toward the person threatened-but the willful doing of the
act with illegal intent." State v. Compton, 77 Wis. 460, 466, 46 N.W. 535, 537
(1890).
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surrounds the use of the term in Wisconsin. In Stockman v. State,'2 2
the court stated the issue of the defendant's liability as to whether the
defendant sought to settle a claim for civil damages which she in good
faith supposed she had or whether she extorted money under threat of
criminal prosecution. The court thus conveyed the idea that good faith
is the decisive element in determining whether or not the crime was
committed. However in O'Neill v. State,243 the court made it quite clear
that good faith alone was not a defense:
The belief on the part of the injured person that he has a right
to recover damages when he demands payment thereof in con-
nection with stating that he will prosecute the wrongdoer if he
fails to pay, does not necessarily constitute a defense to a charge
of extortion .... There is still the crucial issue as to whether the
prosecution was threatened maliciously with the intent to extort
money from the wrongdoer instead of the matter of prosecution
being merely mentioned incidentally in seeking to obtain a settle-
ment by the payment of reasonable compensation for the damage
sustained.2
44
Thus, the O'Neill case holding an instruction to the jury that "the de-
fendants had a right to demand money ... in settlement of their claim,
and to tell [the complainant] that if she did not pay damages, they would
institute criminal proceedings" must be qualified. It should be added
that "defendants had such right if in making their demand and threat
they were not acting so maliciously with the intent to thereby extort
money. '245 This isn't really very helpful for we are right back where
we started. Criminality hangs on the concept of malice and an intent
"to extort."
Case law does not supply much further elucidation on the mental
element in this crime. "To extort" according to one court, "is to wrest
from, to exact, to take under a claim of protection or the exercise of
influence contrary to good morals and common honesty." 246 In accord-
ance with the purpose of the crime the phrase has been construed broad-
ly, to cover any unjustifiable exaction.2 47
Unlike the crime of robbery it is apparent that the actor's claim of
right does not automatically exclude criminal liability under 943.30. The
cases seem to attempt a distinction between the "malicious threat" and
a mere incidental reference to prosecution during efforts or negotiations
to obtain a reasonable settlement.
242 236 Wis. 27, 293 N.W. 923 (1940).
243 Supra note 224.
244 Id. at 400, 296 N.W. at 100, citing with approval Commonwealth v. Coolidge,
128 Mass. 55, 58-59 (1880).
245 Id. at 402, 296 N.W. at 101.
246Commonwealth v. Hoagland, 93 Pa. Super. 274 (1928); See also Hanley
v. State, 125 Wis. 396, 104 N.W. 57 (1905). Conduct of public officers is now
specially controlled by §946.12 which has replaced the old statutes referring to
"extortion" by a public officer. Wis. STAT. §348.29 (1953).
247 See in re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W. 761 (1911).
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943.31 THREATS TO COMMUNICATE DEROGATORY INFORMATION
A. General Comments
This section deals with those who threaten to injure another's reputa-
tion intending thereby to obtain property to which they are not entitled.
Under 943.30 it is not a crime merely to threaten to injure a person's
reputation. 24 8 Nor is it a violation of 943.30 to threaten to expose the
fact that a person has committed a crime in the absence of a threat to
accuse or prosecute. 49 Under the law prior to the Criminal Code, the
only way in which threats to injure the reputation of another could be
made criminal was to find a conspiracy.2 50 No substantial reason exists
for making group-behavior criminal which would not be criminal if done
by one person alone. The crucial question is whether the behavior, and
not the combination, is deemed so serious that it should be made the
subject of criminal liability. 943.31 fills the gap left in the prior law and
makes criminal the threat to do injury to the reputation of another.25 1
The so-called badger game is covered by this section.
B. Requisite Act.
The requisite act is a threat to communicate information. As in
943.30 this section deals with an attempted misappropriation. A com-
pleted misappropriation is not essential.
It is not relevant that the threatened communication will convey true
information. Thus in a Pennsylvania case a crime was found where the
defendant threatened to publish a photograph showing the victim's de-
ceased husband in a "compromising" position with his secretary. 252 That
the threatened publication is libellous is not essential, nor is it required
that the threatened matter be considered immoral by the general com-
munity so long as the reputation is affected by the threat. For example,
A's rich father, a person of particularly strong political views, is A's
only source of financial support. B threatens to tell A's father that A
has voted for a political party of which the father disapproves unless
A pays B a certain sum of money to which B is not entitled. A believes
that if this information is communicated to the father the allowance
will be discontinued. B is clearly guilty of a violation of 943.31.253 This
24sJudevine v. Benzies-Montanve Fuel & Whse. Co., 222 Wis. 512, 523, 269 N.W.
295, 300 (1936).
249 State v. Schultz, 135 Wis. 644, 114 N.W. 565 (1908) ; 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 423
(1924), supra note 228.25o See Wis. STAT. §343.681 (1953); Schultz v. Frankfort M. A. & P. G. Ins. Co.,
151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 386 (1913).
251Statutes of similar import are: ALA. CoDE Trr. 14 Sec. 49 (1940); CONN.
GEN-STAT. Sec. 8379 (1949); VA. CODE §18-232 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§5928 (1949) ; 18 U.S.C. 875(d), 876. The Louisiana general extortion statute
is even broader. It proscribes any threat to do "any other harm."
252 Commonwealth v. Halleron, 163 Pa. Super 583, 63 A. 2d 140 (1949).
253 Threats to injure the reputation are also covered in statutes in Connecticut,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §6069 (1930); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18§4801-4806 (Purdon 1939); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §10806 (Michie
1938) ; see Note, 44 MIcH. L. Rlv. 461, 465.
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follows because the threatened harm need not be unlawful, 25 4 and be-
cause the use of the phrase "to anyone" indicated that the communica-
tion may be made to a person who might have a particularly strong re-
action to the information. It is not material that in fact no injury to the
reputation would in fact occur if the threat were made. 255
C. The Mental Element
The mental element required for a conviction is simply described.
The threat is to induce another to transfer property to a person "known
not to be entitled to it." The state must show that the defendant made
the threat with the intention of inducing a transfer to one "known" not
to be entitled to the property. As in other sections of the Criminal Code
an honest error, whether of law or fact, will be a defense if it negates
the existence of an essential state of mind.
943.32 ROB3ERY
A. General Comments
The behavior proscribed in this section is, as in the extortion statute,
designed to effect misappropriations of property accompanied by some
substantial additional harm, or risk of harm, to the person or property
of another.256 Prior to the Criminal Code the statutes of Wisconsin did
not define the crime of robbery and the common law therefore pre-
vailed.2 57 In two respects the Criminal Code differs from common law
robbery. (1) The scope of the crime has been narrowed in that the
"force" or "fear" which is sufficient to constitute robbery under 943.32
is limited to violence or the threat of violence against a person. Some
decisions at common law included within the scope of robbery, threats
which induced fear of injury to property or reputation.258 Under the
Criminal Code such threats are dealt with under 943.30 and 943.31.
(2) The threatened use of force under 943.32 may include that exer-
cised for the purpose of escaping ("carrying away") with the property.
In the past some decisions have held that the "sneakthief" who takes
254 The policemen who threatens to arrest is an example of one who threatens
nothing unlawful, but whose behavior may, in some circumstances be criminal.
See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, p. 75).
255 See A Rational of the Law of Aggravated Theft, 54 COL. L. REV. 84, 93-94(1954).
256 For a general discussion see Ibid.
257 The prior law was contained in Wis. STATS. §§340.40, 340.43, and 340.44
(1953). Most other states merely incorporated common-law robbery by refer-
ence. However, about a dozen jurisdictions make some attempt at defining
the "fear" required for robbery (e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §212 (1949); HAWAII
REv. LAWS §11595 (1945). The Swiss, German and Indian penal codes limit
the force or threatened force to personal violence. The Swiss and Indian
codes also include as a part of the crime the use of force to effect an escape
with the property. See Swiss CRIM. CODE. ART. 139 (30 J. of Crim. L.
& Criminology-Supp. 1939) ; GERMAN CRIM. CODE §249 (Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., 1947); INDIAN PEN. CODE §390 (Gour. 1910).
258 See Thompson v. State, 61 Neb. 210, 85 N.W. 62 (1901); and CLARK &
MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMEs, 791 (6th ed. 1958).
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property by stealth and who is discovered and uses or threatens to use
force in escaping with the property was not to be convicted of rob-
bery.259 Force used in escaping is treated just as force used in taking
the property. This is in conformity with the policy of the Criminal Code
which makes danger to human life an aggrevating fact in dealing with
property crimes.
260
B. Requisite Action
1. In General
To sustain a conviction the defendant must be one who "takes prop-
erty from the person or presence of the owner." "Owner" is defined as
"a person in possession of the property whether his possession is lawful
or unlawful."' 26 ' The essential condition is that the defendant act in con-
flict with the interest of a person whose right of possession is superior
to his own. For example, as between the clerk in a jewelry store and the
alleged robber, the clerk has possession although as between the clerk
and the store owner the clerk may have only custody rather than pos-
session. The taking from the clerk under circumstances involving an
additional risk to the victim will constitute robbery in Wisconsin.
The taking that the statute requires is dealt with in the law of
theft.26 2 As the critical behavior which the statutes desires to preclude
is not so much the taking, but the accompanying circumstances by which
the taking is accomplished, this provision is unlikely to give difficulty.
It is sufficient if there is some unjustified assertion of control. Any of
the behavior described in 943.20 (1) should be sufficient to fulfill the
requirement of the statute. Thus the bailee of property who, in order
to misappropriate the property, withholds it and uses force to do so may
properly be convicted of robbery under this section. 262 To accomplish
the purpose of the statute, the word "takes" may be construed broadly
within these limits.2 6 Ancient restrictions such as the necessity that the
property be "carried away" as well as taken will not obtain.2 65
The taking must be from the "person or presence of the owner."
"Presence of the owner" means such proximity to the owner as will
enable the actor when he takes the property, to use or threaten the im-
259 See State v. Holmes, 317 Mo. 9, 295 S.W. 71 (1927) ; and State v. Sala, 63
Nev. 270, 169 P. 2d 524 (1946); CLARK & MIARSiiALL, supra note 258, at 789;
and Annot., 58 A.L.R. 656 (1929).
260 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 125.
261 WIs. STAT. §943.32(b). Accord, State v. Clementi, 224 Wis. 145, 272 N.W.
29 (1937).
262 WIS. STAT. §94320 (1959).
263 See James v. State, 53 Ala. 380 (1875) ; and CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note
258, at 785.
264 See Wis. STAT. §939.22(48) (1959).
265 Cases such as Rex. v. Lapier, 1 Leach C.C. 320, 2 East, Pleas of the Crown
557, 708 (1784), will no longer tantalize us. Here the defendant tore an earring
from a lady's ear, but lost his grasp and it fell into her hair. The court was
troubled by the necessity for an "asportation" but concluded that it was present.
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minent use of force.26 6 The essential feature here is the presence of an
increased risk to the safety of the victim. No change in the law is
effected by this provision, for many cases have held that a taking in
the presence of the owner may be regarded as a taking from the per-
son.26 7 Nothing in the statute requires that the victim actually be aware
of the taking if the requisite risk is present.
2. Alternative behavior.
Two kinds of behavior-circumstances are sufficient to make the tak-
ing of property with an intent to steal, robbery.
a) The use of force.
Robbery is committed if the actor used force either for the purpose
of accomplishing the taking of the property or for the purpose of ac-
complishing an escape with the property or for both purposes.
The force necessary must be used for the purpose of overcoming the
victim's physical resistance or physical power of resistance to the taking
or carrying away with the property. Hence some contest of physical
strength, or some exercise of force for the purpose of knocking the
victim unconscious or stunning him in order to steal is implied.268 A
close factual situation is presented here. The thief who knocks a pack-
age from the arms of his intended victim is not guilty of robbery, for
although he deprived the owner of the opportunity to resist, he did not
overcome the owner's physical power of resistance.2 69 On the other
hand, if the owner resists, even slightly, the snatching is sufficient to
constitute robbery. Similarly robbery is committed if the actor stuns
the victim so that he remains unaware of the taking. The distinctions
are admittedly difficult but are justifiably imposed on court or jury
because of the additional risk to the person where some resistance oc-
curs, or where the actor's conduct is directed toward removing the
chance of resistance.
b) Threat of the imminent use of force.
The threat of the imminent use of force against the person, unless
the owner acquiesces to the taking or carrying away of the property, is
the most common method of accomplishing robbery. For example, D
threatens to shoot X unless X hands over a wallet, or D knocks X down
and then demands the wallet. In the latter case it is proper to imply a
threat to continue the beating unless X complies with the demand. Fur-
thermore when the force is inflicted upon Y in the presence of X, for
the purpose of compelling X to acquiesce to the taking of property, the
266 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 124; Commonwealth v. Homer, 235 Mass. 526, 533,
127 N.E. 517, 520 (1920).
267 See cases cited in PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 238 (1952 )and CLARK & MAR-
SHALL, supra note 258 at 786.
268 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 125.
269 State v. Parker, 262 Mo. 169, 170 S.W. 1121 (1914) ; People v. McGinty, 24
Hun. 62 (N.Y. 1881) ; King v. Baker. 1 Leach 290, 168 Eng. Rep. 247 (1783) ;
PERKINS, supra note 267, at 238; CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258 at 788.
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conduct is essentially a threat to continue the abuse unless X complies
with the demand.
The threat must be to use force against a person. If the threat is
simply to burn the victim's house it is not robbery, although it may
constitute a violation of 943.30. The threat may be accomplished by
menacing words or gestures provided the victim has reasonable grounds
for believing that physical force against his person will be used to en-
force acquiescence. The necessity that the victim reasonably believe that
physical force will be used to enforce acquiescence is not apparent on
the face of the statute. The requirement is present, however, because
of the initial requisite that there is a taking of property. There is no
taking of property within the meaning of 943.32 if the victim willingly
consents. It ought to be pretty clear that a heavyweight boxer who gives
up his money when threatened with a beating by an obviously unarmed
eighty year old lady has not been compelled to acquiesce, but has in fact
consented to the taking.270 The risk to person with which the statute
proposes to deal is not present in this situation. Whether or not a par-
ticular threat will suffice depends therefore, on such facts as the rela-
tionship of the parties, the nature and value of the property, and the
apparent ability of the actor to carry out the threat. If the threat is not
likely to compel acquiescence an attempt to commit robbery may be
argued.2 11
Robbery is not accomplished unless the threat is to assert the im-
minent use of force. A threat to kill the victim "tomorrow" unless
property is surrendered would constitute a violation of 943.30 but not
943.32. The distinction is based upon the varying risks to the person
that are present. A threat to do something in the future and not im-
minently, is deemed less dangerous because presumably the victim may
take action to protect himself, and there is a chance that the actor may
change his mind, and the threatened harm will be avoided. Determin-
ing what is imminent requires asking, whether the threat was "near at
hand," ''mediate rather than immediate," "impending," or "on the point
of happening."
3. Aggravating circumstances
Under the law prior to the Criminal Code the robbery was deemed
more serious if it was accomplished while being armed with a dangerous
weapon and with an intent, if resisted, to kill or maim the person
robbed.272 The Criminal Code now proscribes robbery in broader terms
270 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258, at 790-793; People v. Bodkin, 304 Ill. 124,
136 N.E. 494 (1922) ; State v. Sipes, 233 N.C. 633, 65 S.E. 2d 127 (1951).
271 See WIs. STAT. §939.32 (1959).
272 WIS. STAT. §340.39 (1953), Assault and theft, being armed. Robbery under
the statutes of other jurisdictions generally is aggravated by the place where
it is committed or by the way in which it is committed. Under the former is
train robbery (Alabama, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina) and bank robbery (Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
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when the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon. It is not necessary
to prove intent to kill or maim if resisted.
A "dangerous" weapon is defined in 939.22(10) as: "any firearm,
whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and
capable of producing death or great bodily harm, or any other device
or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be
used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm." This
definition is broader than that which was in effect prior to the Code.
"Great bodily harm" is further defined in 939.22(14).
If during the course of the robbery the victim is killed, prosecution
is permissable under the felony-murder statute-third degree murder.1
7 3
A conviction for felony-murder will, however, bar a conviction for rob-
bery.
274
C. The M1iental Element
To sustain a conviction under 943.32 the prosecution must prove an
"intent to steal." Stealing may be broadly construed to include any of
the offenses that come within 943.20, the general theft article.27 5 The
Supreme Court of the United States had indicated in another context
that the word must be broadly construed to give effect to the statute
in which it appears.2
7 6
If the actor mistakenly but honestly believes that by his act he is
recovering his own property, this will not constitute an offense of theft
under 943.20 (1) (a) nor the crime of robbery under 943.32.2 77 Robbery
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and West
Virginia). By far the most prevalent aggravating element is the method used
to commit the robbery, and, of the different aggravating methods, being armed
with a dangerous weapon is the most common (Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, and Wyoming). Others are: Use of torture (California, Vermont,
and West Virginia; wounding or striking (Indiana, Minnesota, and New
York) ; extent of fear produced in the victim (Kansas, North Dakota, and
South Dakota); presence of confederates (Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Minne-
sota, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota) ; use of an auto-
mobile (New York).
273 WIS. STAT. §940.03 (1959).
274 State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 93 N.W. 2d 354 (1958).
275 The Proposed Code referred to one who acted "with intent to appropriate ...
to his own use." (See 343.27 of Proposed Code-Wis. STAT. 1953). The
Code's provision amounts to the same thing-under both, an intent to return
or a claim of right, are defenses.
276United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957), which, in effect, approved a
definition of stealing offered in United States v. Adcock, 49 F. Supp. 351, 353
(W.D. Ky. 1943) wherein the court stated: ". . . the word 'stolen' is used in
the statute not in the technical sense of what constitutes larceny, but in its
well known and accepted meaning of taking the personol property of another
for one's own use without right or law, and that such a taking can exist when-
ever the intent to do so comes into existence and is deliberately carried out
regardless of how the party so taking . . . may have originally come into
possession of it."
277 WIs. STAT. §939.43 (1959).
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is essentially an aggravated form of theft, and if theft is not accom-
plished neither is robbery.278
Where the actor does resort to force or its threat in order to obtain
property to which he believes himself entitled, he may be convicted of
battery, 940.20, or attempted battery, 939.32. Such behavior, in spite of
the actor's claim of right, may create the additional risk to the person
which the criminal law aims to prevent.
943.34 RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
A. General Comments
This section is essentially a simplification of a prior statute, although
the conduct proscribed is stated more succinctly.2 7 9 Punishing receivers
is justified in order to discourage theft by making it more difficult for
the actor to realize the unlawful gain. The receiver of stolen property
is treated with the same severity as the actual thief in view of his at
least equally reprehensible conduct toward the property of others. 2 0
Analagous statutes are found in every state.28' During the preliminary
drafting of the new section it was suggested that the statute explicitly
authorize a greater penalty for the "dealer in stolen property." This
was rejected, and accordingly whether a heavier penalty can be imposed
upon the professional receiver is within the discretion of the judge. The
dealer is treated specially in section 943.35.
Deleted from the prior law is the provision that the receiver could be
prosecuted although the thief had not been convicted. This was dropped
because it was a legacy from the days when a receiver could be convicted
only as an accessory and a receiver could be prosecuted only if the thief
278 See People v. Sheasbey, 82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836 (1927); Glenn v.
State, 49 Tex. Cr. Ap. 349, 92 S.W. 806 (1906) ; 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 124.
But if the actor forcibly collects an unliquidated debt some courts have found
a robbery. See Thomas v. State, 165 Miss. 897, 148 So .225 (1933); Kinsey v.
State, 50 Okla. Cr. Rep. 258, 296 Pac. 1002 (1931); Tipton v. State, 23 Okla.
Cr. Rep. 86,212 Pac. 612 (1923).
279 WIs. STAT. §343.19 (1953).
280 Historically the receiver was treated less severely probably due to the absence
of any "trespassary" taking. See PERKINS, supra note 267, at 274. Hall suggests
that the "fault" of the receiver is greater than that of the thief. HALL, THEFT,
LAW AND SociETY ch. 5 (2d ed. 1955).
281 See, for example: ALA. CODE, TIT. 14, §338 (1940); ARIz. CODE §43-5506
(1939) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-3934 (1947) ; CAL. PENAL CODE §496bb (1949) ;
COLO. STAT. ANN. ch. 48 §95 (2935); CONN. STAT. §8403 (1949); D. C. CODE
§22-2205 (1951); FLA. STAT. §811.16 (1951); HAWAI REv. LAWS §11550
(1945); IDAHO CODE §18-4612 (1947); IOWA CODE §712.1 (1950); Ky. STAT.
§433290 (1948) ; LA. STAT. §14:69 (1950) ; MAINE STAT. ch. 119, §11 (1944) ;
MD. CODE ANN., ART. 27, §562 (1951); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §60 (1933);
MINN. STAT. §622.18 (1949) ; MONT. CODE §94-2721 (1950) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW
§1308 (1944) ; N. MEX. STAT. §§41-4514 and 41-4516 (1941) ; OKLA. STAT. TIT.
21, §1713 (1941) ; PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18, §4817 (1945) ; S. D. CODE §13.3813
(1939). See also National Stolen Property Act which makes the transportation
of stolen property in interstate commerce a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. §2311
et seq.
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had been convicted. Today, inasmuch as receiving stolen property is dealt
with as a separate crime, no need for such a provision now exists.
2812
B. Requisite Act
1. Property.
The broad definition of property contained in 943.20(2) (a) should
be applicable here. However, in view of the civil remedies available
against the receiver of encumbered real property, who knows the prop-
erty to be encumbered, no violence to the purpose of the statute would
be accomplished by restricting 943.34 to the receiving of stolen property
where civil remedies are inadequate to protect the true owner. The
Model Penal Code refers to "movable property. ' 28 3 This solution has
merit and might well be adopted.
2. The property must be stolen.
a) "Stolen" is not a word of art. It received no particular restrictive
definition at common law, and accordingly modern references to "stolen
property" have been to objects which have been the subject of a wide
range of misappropriating conduct, without limitation as to whether it
was the subject of larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses. 2 4 Any
receipt of property taken in violation of 943.20(1) is clearly within the
purview of the receiving statute. The place of the theft should not be
material.
Furthermore, property which the actor receives or conceals, which
has been the object of the behavior specified in all the other misap-
propriation offenses, may properly be considered within this section. 28 5
The gist of the offense of receiving stolen property is the actor's con-
tinued exercise of control over property contrary to the rights of the
true owner. It makes absolutely no difference to the receiver how the
property was acquired by the first wrongdoer. The manner by which
the property was taken has no criminological significance. 2 6 The Model
Penal Code takes the position that "stolen property" means any property
acquired by theft, which in turn is given the very broadest connotation.2 8 7
282 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 127.
283 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.8 (Tent. Draft No. 4) Theft by Receiving. A comment
to this provision states that the question of what property should be included
in the receiving statute should be determined by whether the civil remedies
are adequate. Such interests as intangible non-movable rights under contracts
or patents may be adequately protected by the civil law. Terms such as
"stolen goods" and "personal property" were rejected as being too narrow.
Some courts might have construed the latter phrases as being inapplicable to
minerals taken from land.
284 United States v. Turley, supra note 276.
285 §§943.21-943A0 subject to the exception suggested above that where civil
remedies afford adequate protection the criminal law should not tread.
286 This problem is not adequately dealt with in the standard texts, nor in the
MODEL PENAL CODE. The absence of many reported cases may indicate that
the problem is not a major one. However, see People v. Pollak, 154 App. Div.
716, 139 N.Y. Supp. 831 (2d Dept. 1913).
287 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.63 (Tent. Draft No. 4).
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b) The property in fact must be stolen 2 8 by someone other than
the defendant. Mere belief on the part of the receiver, no matter how
reasonable will not be sufficient to constitute a violation of this statute
if the property is not stolen.2 9 In People v. Jaffe,290 a New York case,
the thief was apprehended by the police and was persuaded to cooperate
in detecting the receiver. The property was delivered to the receiver who,
of course, believed it to be stolen. Although the issue in the case was
whether the defendant was guilty of any attempt to receive stolen goods,
all parties conceded that the offense of receiving could not be charged
because in fact the goods were not stolen.
29 1
Several tentative drafts of 943.34 would have made criminality turn
merely upon the actor's belief that the property was stolen, thus rejecting
the assumption of the Jaffe case. This suggestion was explicitly rejected.
No objection exists to a charge of an attempt to receive stolen property
where the property is not in fact stolen.
292
Perhaps to insulate the criminal law from some domestic disharmony
the theft statute does not proscribe the taking of joint property by one
spouse from the other spouse.293 When one spouse takes jointly-owned
property from the other under circumstances which, but for the statute,
would be theft and disposes of this property by selling it to D, the ques-
tion arises, is D guilty of receiving stolen property. The reasons which
induced the legislature to limit the law of theft do not apply here. Do-
mestic tranquility will not be harmed by convicting D of receiving stolen
property. Surely no principles of strict construction would be violated
by construing the statute so as to proscribe conduct which but for a
debatable technicality might be clear.294 The taking by the spouse is a
misappropriation which, but for policy considerations having nothing
to do with the problem of receiving, is not considered criminal. No
cases of this nature have been discovered, however, and such authority
as has been found does not purport to meet the issue squarely.
295
288 State v. Godsey, 272 Wis. 406, 75 N.W. 2d 572 (1956).
289 Some ambiguity exists here because belief that the articles were stolen is
sufficient to satisfy the required mental element. (See §939.23).
290 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
29 1 Accord, PERKINS, mpra note 267, at 277; CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258,
at 861 and cases cited. But see Shaw v. People, 72 Col. 142, 209 Pac. 812 (1922).
292 Cf., State v. Damms, 9 Wis. 2d 183, 100 N.W. 2d 592 (1960). A good note
on the case is in 1960 Wis. L. REv. 516.
293 WIS. STAT. §943.20 (2) (d) (1959).
294 For an example of this kind of functional construction, see State v. Hunkins,
90 Wis. 264, 62 N.W. 1047, 63 N.W. 167 (1895).
295 Cf., People v. Jaffe, supra note 290. See also such broad statements in the
texts and cases stating that: "It is necessary to show that, in fact and law
the property received had been stolen," CLARC & MARSHALL, supra note 258,
at 861. [Italics Added.] The validity of this generalization is questionable for
it seems to be a relic of the old prerequisite that conviction of the thief pre-
cede the conviction of the receiver.
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3. Receiving or concealing.
The defendant's behavior with respect to the property is described
as "receiving" or "concealing."29 6 The behavior which the statute seeks
to reveal can be summarized best as the acquisition of control.297
a) "Receiving." One can "receive" stolen property without physi-
cally taking possession of it. Thus in LeFanti v. United States,29 s a
conviction for receiving stolen property was sustained where it appeared
that a certain bale of silk was stolen by two boys and, at the direction
of the defendant, was dumped among some bushes or weeds along a
road, although the defendant, who was arrested almost immediately
after this dumping, asserted no actual physical control over the property.
A conviction can be sustained if the defendant is in a position to exer-
cise some kind of unauthorized control over the property. The defendant
can be found to have received stolen property if the property has been
delivered to another at the direction of the defendant.299
b) "Concealing." The defendant may be found to have "concealed"
stolen property where evidence of any delivery to him is lacking. Hence
the unexplained possession of stolen property under circumstances
which indicate that the defendant knew it to be stolen 30 may amount
to the concealment that the statute requires.
C. Value
In view of the fact that the severity of punishment varies with the
value of the property received, it has been held that only the jury can
make such findings if a sentence based upon a value in excess of $100
is to be imposed.0 '
D. The Mental Element
The State must prove that the defendant "intentionally" received
stolen property. "Intentionally" is defined in 939.23 and as applied to
the crime of receiving stolen property, it effects no change on established
law. The actor must either intend to receive stolen property, or believe
(rather than "know") that he receives stolen property. 02 A subjective
290 Under the old law "receiving" and "concealing" were two substantive offenses,
Huotte v. State, 164 Wis. 354, 160 N.W. 64 (1916).
297 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.8, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2); 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW 287 (1957).
298 259 Fed. 460 (3d Cir. 1919).
299 Cases in other jurisdictions are collected in CLARK & MfARSHALL, supra note
258, at 858; PERKINS, supra note 267, at 275 and 2 WHARTON, supra note 297,
at 287.
300 Cf., State v .Godsey. supra note 288, where the Court reversed a conviction
on the ground that the evidence did not establish that the defendant knew the
property to be stolen, although the defendant had failed to produce any evi-
dence of ownership of the property in question.
301 Cf., Heyroth v. State, 275 Wis. 104, 81 N.W. 2d 56 (1957), which was decided
under the prior statute which provided that if the value of the goods stolen
did not exceed $20 the imprisonment could be in the county jail for six months.
See also, Koch v. State, 126 Wis. 470, 106 N.W. 531 (1906) and State v.
Clementi, supra note 261.
302 Belief that the goods received were stolen has been held the equivalent of
[Vol. 44
CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATIONS
test of knowledge or belief is applied here, in spite of vigorous criticism
that it is almost impossible to prove actual knowledge. Hence some
statutes merely require the jury to find that the defendant "ought to have
known that the property was stolen."
In Meath v. State, the Court stated:
By the express language of this statute [4417 Stats. 1898] an
essential element of the offense is that the defendant shall, at
the time of his receiving or dealing with the stolen property, know
that such property has been stolen. it is as essential that the jury
shall, beyond a reasonable doubt, find that he had such knowledge
at the time of his transaction with the property as they must that
the property was theretofore stolen.3 4
Accordingly, it is reversible error to instruct the jury that they need
only determine that the defendant "ought to have known" that the prop-
erty was stolen.30 5 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has been insistent
that the question of the defendant's actual knowledge or belief be clear-
ly presented. In a case where the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction, a new trial was ordered in the exercise of the Court's dis-
cretionary powers because of its "misgivings whether the trial of the
case was so conducted as to present sharply to the attention of the trial
judge the distinction held to be essential in the Meath Case."306 The
required mnens rea may be inferred from the evidence. As the Court in
the Meath case stated:
Such guilty knowledge, or its equivalent, guilty belief, may be
proven by circumstantial evidence, but it is not sufficient that
such circumstantial evidence convinces the jury beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant ought to have known that the prop-
erty was stolen; it must go a substantial step further and satisfy
them that he did know or believe. 307
A vast variety of evidence is relevant therefore. The inadequacy of the
price paid for the goods, the irresponsibility of the vendor, the secrecy
of the transaction, are examples of pertinent evidence.
Some difficulty may be presented in cases where the defendant is
knowledge, Meath vs. State, 174 Wis. 80, 83, 182 N.W. 334 (1921) and Hey-
roth v. State, spra note 301. A tentative draft of the Code penalized whoever
"believing or suspecting" that property was stolen, receives or disposes of it.
This was rejected apparently on the ground that its description was too broad.
303 ALA. CODE, TIT. 14 §338 (1934 Supp.) ;'LA. REv. STAT. §14:69 (1950), 18 P.S.
§4817 (1949 Supp.), but Commonwealth v. Frankina, 39 A. 2d 628 (1944),
seems contradictory; W. VA. CODE §5959 (1949).
304 Supra note 302, at 83, 182 N.W. at 335; accord, Oosterwyk v. State, 242 Wis.
398, 8 N.W. 2d 346 (1943).
305 MLeath v. State, supra note 302, notwithstanding any intimation in State v.
Jacobs, 167 Wis. 299, 166 N.W. 324 (1918), to the contrary. Even in the Jacobs
decision the court insisted on an "individual test of the defendant's guilty
knowledge." See also CLARK & MARSHALL supra note 258, at 864-865.
306 Oosterwyk v. State, supra note 304, at 405, 8 N.W. 2d at 349.
307 Meath v. State, supra note 302, at 83, 182 N.W. 2d at 335, quoted approvingly
in Heyroth v. State, supra note 302 at 109, 81 N.W. 2d at 60.
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discovered with stolen property in his possession. In State v. Godsey s0
the defendant was charged with receiving stolen property, an automo-
bile worth about $2400, although there was no direct evidence of a
theft. The defendant failed to produce any evidence of ownership nor
did he claim to possess any legal title. His testimony was contradictory,
but he once testified that he had purchased the car from someone for
$1250 and had paid $250 down. The Supreme Court held the evidence
to be insufficient to sustain a conviction on the ground that there was
an entire lack of evidence that he received it "knowing the same to have
been stolen." The Court cited Corpus Juris Secundum with approval:
The unexplained possession by one person of goods belonging to
another does not establish that a theft has been committed....
Since . . . the thief cannot be guilty of receiving stolen goods
which he himself has stolen, the evidence in a prosecution for
receiving stolen property must be sufficient to prove that the
property had been stolen or unlawfully obtained by someone
other than accused .... 309
Once the State established that the goods were stolen unexplained pos-
session is relevant to prove the crime of receiving.3 10
The terms of the statute accord no special dispensation to one who
intentionally receives stolen property with the added intention of return-
ing the property to the true owner. Such a person is specifically covered
by the Model Penal Code's treatment.3 11
943.35 RECEIVING PROPERTY FROM CHILDREN
A. General Comments.
This section, which imposes strict liability on dealers in second-hand
articles or junk and pawnbrokers, is substantially a restatement of two
prior statutes.1 2 The rationale for this section is that pawnbrokers, sec-
ond-hand and junk dealers may furnish the means by which thieves
may dispose of stolen property, and consequently the law is justified in
308 272 Wis. 406, 407, 75 N.W. 2d 572, 573 (1956).
30976 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods, §18 (1952).
310 Jenkins v. State, 62 Wis. 49, 21 N.W. 232 (1885), cf., State v. Johnson, 11
Wis. 2d 130, 104 N.W. 2d 379 (1960). To prove theft the owner of the goods
allegedly stolen should testify as to his ownership if possible. State v. Moon,
41 Wis. 684, 688 (1877).
3 1 1 MODEL PENAL CODE §206.8, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2) states: "The typical
case raising this problem is that of an insurance company or detective agency
which advertises that it will pay a reward for the return of stolen property,
'no questions asked.' A minority of the present statutes make provisions for
this by requiring, for example, that the receiving be without intent to return
to the owner or with intent to use for the actor's own purposes. Statutes not
containing such provisions would probably be construed to be inapplicable to
receiving on behalf of the owner. Of course, agreements to refrain from prose
cution will be subject to provisions . . . dealing with compounding criminal
liability."
312 WIs. STAT. §348.477 (1953), Junk dealers; minors, and Wis. STAT. §348.478
(1953), Pawns by minors prohibited.
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placing a heavy burden on such businesses. 313 Children are sometimes
encouraged to steal because of the ready means that pawnbrokers and
second-hand junk dealers afford for disposing of the misappropriated
property. Therefore such businesses are absolutely prohibited from pur-
chasing or acquiring an interest for value in personal property from
a child under eighteen without the written consent of the child's parent
or guardian.
314
B. Strict Liability
In view of the absence of any requirement that the defendant act
"intentionally," "knowingly," or words to the same effect, and consider-
ing 939.23, it is clear that to sustain a conviction the State need do no
more than prove the requisite acts.313 It is equally clear that the de-
fendant's belief, even if reasonable, that the child from whom he ac-
quired the property was eighteen or over is not relevant.310 The statute
would be virtually meaningless and would add nothing to the conven-
tional receiving stolen property crime unless it is construed as it was
intended. Criminal intent is not an element in this crime.
C. The Thrust of the Statute
It applies only to dealers in second-hand articles or junk and pawn-
brokers, or others who loan money and take personal property as a
security. The risk of the statute, therefore, is placed upon a particular
business or calling and not upon the casual purchaser.
A pawnbroker includes "any person who engages in the business
of lending money on the deposit or pledge of personal property, other
than choses in action, securities, or written evidences of indebtedness;
or purchases personal property with an expressed or implied agreement
or understanding to sell it back at a subsequent time at a stipulated
price."3:17
The dealer must have the written consent of the parent or guardian
to the child's disposition of the property. It is entirely conceivable that
313 They are subject to a high degree of regulation under §59.07 (38).314 Analagous legislation: Several states have similar legislation. Some make
purchases presumptive evidence that the property received from children is
stolen. See: ARIz. CODE §43-5506 (1949 Supp.) [presumptive evidence that prop-
erty was stolen if it is jewelry, silver or plated ware and purchased from
person under 18 not at a regular place of business]; CAL. PENAL CODE §496(1949) [presumptive evidence that property was stolen if bought from person
under 18 not at a regular place of business]; MONT. REv. CODES, TiT. 94-2721
(1947 REv. CODE) [same as California except the age is 21]. Other states make
it a crime to make such purchase: N. J. REv. STAT. 2:164-5 (1949 Supp.)
[purchase from a person under 16 of jewelry, hardware, waste metal, plumbers'
or builders' supplies or fixtures, metal pipes or conduits, junk of a metallic
nature, bric-a-brac, second-hand clothing, or house furnishing goods, which
may have been stolen, is a misdemeanor]; IND. STAT. §18-3236 (1950), and
N. Y. PENAL LAW §484(4) (1944).
315 The 1950 recommended Code referred to "intentional" purchases from chil-
dren. This was deleted in subsequent drafts in view of the language of §939.23.
316 WIS. STAT. §939.43(2) (1959) "A mistake as to the age of a minor . . . is not
a defense."
317 WIS. STAT. §115.10 (3) (a) (1959).
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the child might produce a false instrument purportedly giving such con-
sent and that the dealer or pawnbroker might rely upon it. The mistake
of the dealer or pawnbroker would be no defense under the general
mistake statute because it would not negate "the existence of a state
of mind essential to the crime." This strict result is again justifiable be-
cause of the purpose of the statute which would be frustrated if even
the good faith of the pawnbroker or dealer were a defense.
943.37 ALTERATION OF PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION MARKS
A. General Comments
The purpose of this section is to deter behavior which will make it
more difficult to identify property. The risk of loss for misappropria-
tions of such property is considerably enhanced where characteristic
marks of identification such as serial numbers, identification marks and
numbers are removed. Prior to the Code three different sections dealt
with such conduct. 318 The Criminal Code has codified the essential pro-
visions of the prior law. Because the 1953 Proposed Code was consid-
erably broader in its treatment, it was rejected in favor of wording that
adopted many of the specific provisions of the prior law.319
B. The Mental Element
The State must prove that the defendant acted "with intent to pre-
vent the identification of the property." Such an intent may be inferred
from such acts as filing off the motor number from an automobile en-
gine. The Proposed Code had several prima facie evidence provisions
which were in effect explicit statements constituting evidence that would
permit a jury to find the requisite intent.32 Thus any alteration or re-
moval of an identification mark constituted such prima facie evidence.
The 1950 recommended code even included a statement to the effect that
the prima facie evidence provisions did not apply to anyone who re-
covered property which was stolen and on which the serial number or
mark had been altered or removed prior to the recovery. The deletion
318 Wis. STAT. §§343.183 Destruction of manufacturer's serial number; 343.452
Removal of brands, etc. from casks; and 343.54 Celleration and forgery of
log marks.
319 The Proposed Code stated: 343.31 Alteration of property identification marks.
(1) Whoever alters or removes any serial number or other identification
mark on personal property with intent to prevent its identification may
be fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or
both. The alteration or removal of the serial number or other identifica-
tion mark on personal property is prima facie evidence of an intent to
prevent identification of the property.(2) Whoever, knowing that the serial number or other identification
mark has been altered or removed, possesses personal property with
intent to prevent its identification may be fined not more than $200 or
imprisoned not more than 6 months or both. Possession of two or
more similar items of personal property with the serial number or the
other identification marks on it altered or removed is prima facie evi-
dence of knowledge of the alteration or removal and of an intent to
prevent identification of the property.
320 See Spaulding v. C. & N.W. Ry. Co., 33 Wis. 582 (1873).
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of this prima facie provision and its exception means only that it was
felt to be too cumbersome to include such provisions.
C. Requisite Act
1) Identification marks on logs and lumber.
This provision is based upon old section 343.54321 which made it a
crime to cut out, alter, or destroy any mark made by the owner on his
logs or lumber without his consent. The prior law required that the logs
or lumber had to be in or near a river or some tributary.322 This is no
longer required-the logs or lumber may be anywhere. If the state fails
to prove that the altering or removing of the identification mark was
done "with intent to prevent identification" a conviction may still lie
for a violation of 943.01.
2) Altering or removing mark from a receptacle used by beverage
manufacturers.
This general provision was drafted to replace 343.452 which dealt
with the removal of brands, names or marks from certain containers of
beverages. 323 The conduct sought to be proscribed is dealt with much
more succinctly than in the prior law.
3) Altering or removing manufacturer's identification number.
Manufactured goods are frequently identified by a serial number.
The alteration or removal of this number renders the goods less trace-
able and accordingly the alteration or removal of such numbers is pro-
hibited. This provision is very similar in effect to the prior law ,343.183,
although the new section is once again less cumbersome.
Punished also is the possession of personal property with knowledge
that the identification number has been altered or removed. Such per-
sons might also be convicted for receiving stolen property; for the
knowledge that a serial number has been altered or removed may be
evidence which together with other circumstances would permit the jury
to convict the actor of receiving stolen property. To sustain a convic-
tion under 943.37, however, the prosecution need only prove that the
defendant possessed property with knowledge that the identification was
removed. Prosecution is aided by the prima facie provision to the effect
that possession of two or more similar items with the identification num-
321 See for similar legislation N. Y. PENAL LAW §436(b) (1944).
322 See Wis. STAT. §343.51 (1953).
323 WiS. STAT. §343.452 (1953): Removal of brands, etc., from casks. Any
person who shall willfully, maliciously or wantonly obliterate, injure,
or destroy the names, marks or brands affixed to any cask, barrel, keg,
bottle, jug, fountain, box or other package used or intended to be used
by any person or firm domiciled in this state or by any corporation
created under the laws thereof and engaged in the manufacture or sale
of ale, porter, lager beer, soda water, mineral water or other beverage
in any such package as is herein mentioned, shall be punished by im-
prisonment in the county jail not exceeding sixty days or by fine of not
more than one hundred dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.
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ber removed or altered will permit the jury to infer, together with other
evidence, an intent to prevent identification of the property.
This provision mentions only identification "numbers," and is thus
similar to the prior law. The Proposed Code referred to identification
"marks." Furthermore, the section refers only to "manufactured" items
while the Proposed Code referred to any personal property. The present
statute is, therefore, considerably narrower in scope than the Proposed
Code.
943.38 FORGERY
A. General Comments
Prior to the Code separate statutes were needed to deal with conduct
not within the traditional definition of common law forgery. This sec-
tion supplies a comprehensive definition of forgery. Although it em-
bodies a consolidation of sixteen prior statutes, it remains one of the
more complex sections of the Criminal Code, primarily because of the
attempt to create two classes of forgery, one subject to less serious pen-
alties than the other. A dominant feature in the Code's treatment of
forgery is the combination of the once separate crimes of forgery and
uttering, into a single offense.3 24
As defined in the Code, forgery involves an attempt to misappropri-
ate the property, services or reputation of another. No actual misap-
propriation need occur. Because attempted misappropriation creates a
more indiscriminate risk of loss when it is attempted by means of a
false making of certain kinds of commonly relied upon documents or
objects, the criminal law has traditionally treated the forger more
severely than the ordinary thief. The penalty imposed is determined by
the risks created rather than the value of what the actor attempts to se-
cure. Furthermore certain writings and objects are relied upon by so-
ciety in the transaction of business affairs and any act which might
serve to cast suspicion on the validity of such writings or objects should,
according to the rationale of forgery, be proscribed.3 25 A consolidation
of the false-making-offenses as complete as that contained in the Pro-
posed Code was rejected in favor of a section establishing a gradation
of penalties depending upon the seriousness of the defendant's act.3 26
324 State v. Nichols, 7 Wis. 2d 126, 95 N.W. 2d 765 (1959). They were once
separate offenses: Zeidler v. State, 189 Wis. 44, 206 N.W. 872 (1926).
325 The Model Penal Code retains a forgery provision but recognizes that the
need for a separate forgery statute is diminished by the presence of provisions
dealing with fraud, attempt, complicity, and professional criminality. See
MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1, comment (Tent. Draft No. 11).
326The Proposed Code stated: 343.32 Forgery. Whoever with intent to defraud
does any of the following may be fined not more than $5000 or im-
prisoned not more than 10 years or both:
(1) Makes or alters any writing of a kind having legal efficacy or com-
monly relied upon in business or commercial transactions so that it
purports to have been made by another, or at another time, or with
different terms, or by authority of one who did not give such authority;
or
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B. Proscribed Acts.
Paragraph .1) of 943.38 deals with conduct which was forgery at
common law and under the prior statutes.32 7 It requires a false making
or altering.
1) False making or altering.
At common law courts required a false making or altering. False
referred not to the contents or to the facts stated, but to the act of mak-
ing or altering.328 Courts in many jurisdictions have struggled to make
sense out of the distinction between the false making of an instrument
(which was forgery), and the production of a genuine instrument which
merely contained false statements which was not a forgery.329 To con-
stitute forgery, according to this view, the instrument must be made to
appear to have authenticity it does not possess, because it purports to
be an act done by another, or an act done at a different time.330 A false
making can be accomplished by alterations made by inserting words or
making erasures. Courts have not, however, agreed on when a "false
making" includes an act done by an agent.331 In view of the broad scope
given to forgery by courts considering Wisconsin law and the compre-
hensive treatment of the subject in the Criminal Code, such problems
(2) Makes or alters any object so that it appears to have value because
of antiquity, rarity or authorship which it does not possess; or(3) Utters as true or possesses with intent to utter (whether as true
or false) any writing or other object which the actor knows has been
made or altered in the manner described in subsection (1) or (2).
327 The following statutes (1953 Wisconsin Statutes) were repealed and replaced:
343.38 False certificate of stock, which in part penalized officers and
agents of corporations who signed false certificates of stock or certifi-
cates which were not authorized by the board of directors or by the
charter or by-laws. This act is within the purview of 943.39.
343.56 Forgery and counterfeiting, was the general forgery section.
It prohibited the false making of a long list of instruments.
343.59 Connecting parts of bank notes, prohibited joining together dif-
ferent parts of genuine instruments in order to make an additional one.
343.60 Fictitious signatures to note, etc. penalized the signing of a
name, purporting to be that of any corporation officer or agent, to any
evidence of debt issued by such corporation.
328 See 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 947 (1932).
329 The close distinction is illustrated by DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 Pac.
359 (1918) where the defendant, a railroad section boss, padded the time-roll
which he was authorized to keep. This was held not to be a forgery. On the
other hand the famous case of Queen v. Ritson, L. R. 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 200(1869), held that forgery was committed when a false date was placed in a
deed for the purpose of indicating that the deed was prior in time to an
encumbrance.330 State v. Coyle, 41 Wis. 267 (1876).
331 Pasadena Investment Co. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 132 Cal. Ap. 2d 328, 282 P. 2d
124, 52 A.L.R. 203 (1955). Plaintiff had a bond from defendant which in-
demnified him against any loss through forged instruments. Plaintiff purchased
certain accounts receivable evidenced by invoices, and by written receipts
signed by persons who had received the goods. The invoices and the receipts
were false in that they did not represent goods sold, although the signatures
of the assignors were genuine. This was held not to be a forgery. Contra,
Security National Bank of Durand v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 246 F. 2d 582
(7th Cir. 1957) wherein the court was required to find Wisconsin law.
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need no longer be a source of great difficulty under 943.38. A false mak-
ing, said the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in a case involving Wisconsin
law, "might be accomplished by the fraudulent application of a false
signature to a true instrument or a real signature to a false instru-
ment. '332 The important elements are the intent to defraud and the
means used by the actor. Hence a false making or altering can oe ac-
complished by any of the means stated in the statute. Viz., "so that it
purports to have been made by another, or at another time, or with
different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such au-
thority." [Emphasis supplied]
2) Object of forgery
The writings and objects which are specially protected by the law
of forgery are listed. Almost every kind of instrument affecting pri-
vate or public rights is included. The first category listed is the broadest,
"a writing or object whereby legal rights or obligations are created, ter-
minated or transferred, or any writing commonly relied upon in busi-
ness or commercial transactions as evidence of debt or property rights.
... This functional description replaced a long list of instruments in
the prior statute.3 33 It is not as comprehensive a description, however,
as that contained in the Proposed Code which referred to "any writing
of a kind having legal efficacy or commonly relied upon in business or
commercial transactions. 3 34 To determine whether the instrument pur-
ports to deal with legal rights or obligations or whether it is relied upon
as evidence of a debt or property rights, the court may properly consider
extrinsic evidence.3 3
5
Under the Code the results would probably be in accord with a de-
cision of the United States Court of Military Appeals. The object forged
according to the Uniform Code of Military Justice must, if genuine, ap-
parently impose a legal liability on another, or change his legal right or
liability to his prejudice.3 3 6 D, while intoxicated and under an assumed
332 Quick Service Box Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 95 F. 2d 15, 16-17(7th Cir. 1938), cited approvingly in Security National Bank of Durand v.
Fidelity St. Casualty Co. of N.Y., 246 F. 2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1957) ; but cf.,
Fitzgibbons Boiler Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Co., 105 F. 2d 893(2d Cir. 1939). The Wisconsin view has been approved by the commentators
to the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 11).
a3 WIS. STAT. §343.56 (1953) which included charters, wills, testaments, writings
obligatory, letter of attorney, insurance policies, bills of lading, bills of ex-
change, promissory notes, or any orders, acquittances or discharges for money
or other property, bank notes, etc. Similar statutes are found in many juris-
dictions, e.g., NEW YORK PENAL LAW §884 (1944).
334 Proposed Code §343.32(1). Accord, In re Court de Toulouse Lautrec, 102 F.
878 (7th Cir. 1900).
335 Cf., State v. Schwartz, 64 Wis. 432, 25 N.W. 417 (1885) where the defendant
altered a promissory note which said "... . I promise to pay ... $5.00 as per
deed." to ". . . $25.00 as per deed, 10 per cent till paid."
336 Uniform Code of Military justice, art. 123 provides: Any person . . . who,
with intent to defraud-(1) falsely makes or alters any signature, or any
part of any writing which would, if genuine, apparently impose a legal liabil-
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name, married X. Ten days later he regretted his haste and sent a letter
to the girl under the purported signature of a legal officer stating that D
had been killed, and that since the marriage was not known to the gov-
ernment no "retributions" [sic] would be made. The making of this
peculiar letter was held not to be a forgery because the letter could have
no possible legal efficacy. 337 An instrument obviously ineffective on its
face does not constitute a forgery. 33s Lurye v. State339 is illustrative.
The City of Superior, heavily in debt during the depression, had in July
1933 no funds with which to meet its current obligations. The common
council therefore issued scrip, although there was no authority for them
to do so, and no action against the city to collect on the scrip could have
been maintained. The defendant was charged with uttering forged
scrip3" and his defense was that the charge did not lie because the real
scrip was void on its face. 341 The Court sustained the conviction holding:
... the document in question did not carry upon its face evidence
of the fact that it was void. The so-called certificate of indebted-
ness was legally nothing more nor less than an acknowledgment
of the receipt of a certain sum and a promise on the part of the
city to return it, when and if the city was able. If it be true that
no action could have been maintained upon it, the city was cer-
tainly under a moral obligation to carry out its part of the ar-
rangement. The certificate of indebtedness had the appearance of
validity, and could therefore be the subject of forgery. 342
Consequently if the writing or object otherwise fulfills the require-
ments and it has the appearance of validity, it may be the subject of
forgery. Extrinsic facts may be introduced to show that the item may
have the appearance of validity.343
An overlap with Federal crimes should be noted. Title 18 of the
United States Code contains some 39 different sections pertaining to
the forging or counterfeiting of items in which the Federal government
has a particular interest.3" A conviction or acquittal for forgery in Wis-
ity on another or change his legal right or liability to his prejudice . . . is
guilty of forgery.33 United States v. Strand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 297 (1955) "To be subject of forgery."
The court said, "The letter must be capable of being used as proof of the facts
it recites .. . It must be invested with some legal force . . . Hence, in the
absence of allegations of extrinsic facts indicating how the letter could have
had some legal effect, it is a false, but not a forged writing." See also Johns
v. State, 23 Wis. 504 (1868) and People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N.Y.) 778, 784(1829).338 See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1300 (1948) Invalid Instrument as Subject of Forgery.
39 221 Wis. 68, 265 N.W. 221 (1936).34 0 WIs. STAT. §343.57 (1953).
341 Defendant relied upon Johns v. State, supra note 337.342Supra note 339, at 76, 265 N.W. at 224, citing Norton v. State, 129 Wis. 659,
109 N.W. 531 (1906).
343 No Wisconsin cases have been discovered, but cases in other jurisdictions sup-
port the view. Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467, 25 Am. Rep. 639 (1875) and
CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258, at 852.
344 18 U.S.C. §§471-509.
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consin does not automatically bar conviction in the Federal courts, and
vice versa.3
45
The other objects of forgery are:
a) a public record or certified or authenticated copy.
b) an official authentication or certification of a copy of a public
record.
c) an official return or certificate entitled to be received in evidence
of its contents.
C. The Act of Forging
The defendants making or altering must be of such a nature that the
writing or object "purports to have been made by another, or at another
time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not
give such authority."
An instrument may purport to be made by another although no ef-
fort to counterfeit that signature is made.346 It is sufficient if there is
an intent to indicate that the writing or object was made by another or
at another time.
State v. Schwart 347 is illustrative of a case involving the making of
an instrument with different provisions. The defendant held a valid
promissory note which stated "For value received, . . . I promise to
pay to Wm. Schwartz, or order, $5.00 as per deed." This was altered
by the defendant who erased the dollar sign and added some terms
to read, "For value received, . . . I promise to pay to Wm. Schwartz,
or order, $25.00 as per deed, 10 per cent till paid." A forgery conviction
was sustained.
The scope of this particular provision to a false making by authority
of one who did not give such authority has not been fully determined,
although it probably enlarges the common law definition.3 48 It does
appear to be illustrated by the case of Security National Bank of Durand
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 9 a 7th Circuit Court of Appeals
decision involving Wisconsin law. This civil case was decided on the
basis of the Criminal Code. The plaintiff bank sued on an indemnity
bond issued by the defendant against any loss sustained by the plaintiff
on the faith of written instruments "which prove to have been counter-
feit or forged as to the signature." The bank loaned money to a cor-
poration engaged in the business of buying and selling dairy products.
The corporation sold products to purchasers which sale was evidenced
by an invoice. To secure the advance of funds, the corporation sent a
3-1 Cf., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959).
34 Schmidt v. State, 169 Wis. 575, 173 N.W. 638 (1919).
3-7 Supra note 335.
348 It clearly replaces §343.38, False certificate of stock, which penalized officers
of corporations who signed false certificates of stock which were not au-
thorized either by the directors-the charter or the by-laws.
349 246 F. 2d 582 (7th Cir. 1957).
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duplicate invoice to the bank and assigned the account receivable. The
bank then paid 80% of the face value of the invoice to the corporation.
The president and managing agent of the corporation acted for the cor-
poration during these transactions and signed the assignments of accounts
receivable. In November of 1954, the president of the corporation pre-
sented a number of invoices and assigned them to the bank. The bank
paid some $17,000 to the corporation on the strength of the invoices
and assignments. It subsequently appeared that these invoices did not
represent actual goods sold. The corporation became insolvent, and the
bank alleged that it suffered a loss by forgery as to signature. The de-
fendant insurer argued that because the signatures upon the invoices
and assignments were genuine, no forgery was accomplished, and the
assignments and invoices were merely false statements. The Court re-
jected the defendants' argument and held that the acts of the president
of the corporation fell within the ambit of the Wisconsin forgery
statute then in existence. 350 Despite authority to the contrary, the Court
followed the rule announced in Quick Service Box Co. v. St. Paul Mer-
cury Indemnity Co.,35 1 wherein the Court stated:
... though one may under certain conditions have authority to
sign certain names, yet, if he sign such to a false document or to
an unauthorized one, it is forgery. . .forgery is not necessarily
confined to the false writing of another's name. It may be com-
mitted in other ways. The essence of forgery does not so much
consist in counterfeiting as in endeavoring to give appearance of
truth to a mere deceit and falsity; and either to impose that upon
the world as the solemn act of another which it is not or to
make a man's own act appear to have been done at a time when
it was not performed and by force of such falsity to give it an
operation which in truth and justice it ought not to have. In other
words, if the deceit consists in making it appear that a man's
own act was done under circumstances which would make it valid
and genuine, when in fact it was false and unauthorized, the
result is the same.3 52
D. The Mental Element
The mental element which the State must prove to sustain a con-
viction for forgery under 943.38(1) and (3) is described as an "intent
to injure or defraud." In so describing the mental element, the Criminal
Code is in accord with the prior statutes 35 3 and the common law of forg-
ery. The accomplishment of the fraud is not required in view of the ob-
jective of the law of forgery to deal with attempted misappropriations.
An earlier draft of this section would have spelled out the meaning of the
3 5 0 Wis. STAT. §343.56 (1953) "Any person who shall falsely make, alter, forge
or counterfeit . . .an . . .assignable instrument with intent to injure or de-
fraud shall be punished...
35195 F. 2d 15 (7th Cir. 1938).3 52 Id. at 17.
353 Wis. STAT. §343.56 (1953).
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intent as "an intent to deceive and thereby to induce another to relin-
quish any property or to act or omit to act." The comments to the Pro-
posed Code define the mental element as "an intent either to obtain
property from another or to cause him to do some act or refrain from
some act in reliance on the writing or object being genuine."3
The leading case with respect to the requirement of fraud is State
v. Wells.355 The defendant had acquired title to certain lands from one
Robbins through two deeds of conveyance. One of the deeds contained
an agreement on the part of the grantee to assume a mortgage on the
premises. Some time later the defendant agreed to sell these premises
to another. This agreement was made late in the evening and no one
was then available to draw the conveyance. A real-estate agent who was
present suggested that one of the prior deeds be used by erasing Well's
name and substituting the name of the purchaser. Wells alleged that
he did not at first agree to this procedure, and that he consulted with
Robbins before the deed was eventually altered as suggested. A con-
viction for forgery was reversed and the defendant discharged by the
court which stated:
The mere fact that Wells employed this method of conveying
title ... in view of the agreement in the deed to pay the mortgage
and in view of the judgments recorded against him, would per-
haps justify an inference that he employed this method for the
purpose of defrauding his judgment creditors or for the purpose
of escaping liability upon the agreement to pay the mortgage.
But the explanatory evidence revealing the situation and the cir-
cumstances under which Wells was prompted to make the changes
in the deed conclusively negative any intent on the part of Wells
to defraud anyone .... The attitude of Wells before and after the
transaction strongly indicates that his anxiety in the premises
was set at rest by the interview (with Robbins) .... Although
the method adopted was capable of working fraud, especially upon
the judgment creditors, there is no reason to believe that the
method was adopted for the purpose of working a fraud upon
any one .... 'The transaction was not forgery, it was foolish-
ness.'
356
In the Wells case the Court makes it quite clear that to prove or negate
fraud the entire surroundings of the transaction may supply relevant
evidence. 35 7
The Wells case affords an example of a case where the jury's find-
ing of an "intent to defraud" was overruled. That this will not be done
354 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 130.
355 195 Wis. 551, 218 N.W. 811 (1928).
358 Id. at 553.
3 Accord, Schmidt v. State, supra note 346.
The Wells case cites with approval People v. Kemp, 76 Mich. 410, 43
N.W. 439 (1889).
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in closer cases is illustrated by Lurye v. State,358 where the court recog-
nized that the jury could have concluded that no intend to defraud was
present on the basis of evidence of the defendant's reputation and con-
duct in the community together with his protestations of innocence. But,
said the Court:
... his story does not ring true. He admitted. .. that he pur-
chased $2500 of scrip (which was forged) for $700. . . .Such
a discount would indicate to any ordinary prudent, careful busi-
ness man that there was something wrong. The only thing that
could be wrong was the fact that the scrip was not genuine....
The jury were not bound by his statements as to his inten-
tion .... 3-9
It is well established that it is not necessary to prove that the de-
fendant intended to defraud any particular person. It is sufficient if the
defendant knows that the writing or object is not genuine and he intends
some reliance upon it.360
E. Uttering.
The crime of uttering, once the subject of separate statutes,361 is
now merely another phase of forgery and is subject to the same penalty.
The act of uttering or possession with intent to utter are equally criminal.
Forgery is an attempt to defraud; uttering is usually the consummation
of the fraud, and both are now merged into the single offense proscribed
by 943.38.
In the recent case of State v. Nichols, 62 the Supreme Court con-
firmed the purpose of the Code's draftsmen that forgery and uttering
were to be combined so that they constituted but a single offense. Ac-
cordingly, where one forges an instrument and then utters it as genuine,
there can be only one sentence.
The act of uttering usually is accomplished by a passing or delivery
of the instrument, but the simple presentation of the instrument is prob-
ably sufficient to constitute the offense. In view of its common law
origin the experience of other jurisdictions is relevant in defining the
offense.3 63 The Model Penal Code defines "utter" as meaning "issue,
authenticate, transfer, publish, or otherwise give currency to a forged
writing or object. ' 36 4 The definition makes sense and is in accord with
the common law.
F. Forgery of Other Instruments.
The false making of pictures, sculptures, antiques, labels, trade-
358 Supra note 339.
59 Id. at 76, 265 N.W. at 225.
360 State v. Morton, 8 Wis. (167) 352 (1859) ; see also PERINS, supra note 267,
at 304, and CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258, at 844.
361 §343.57 Uttering forged paper; §343.663 Uttering forged instrument; and
§343.666 Penalty for tendering, using, or selling.
3627 Wis. 2d 126, 95 N.W. 2d 765 (1959).
363 See CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 258, at 857.
364 MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
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marks, transportation tickets, and real estate abstracts is covered by
paragraph (3) of 943.38. Illustrative is the making of an object to
look like a dinosaur head or a piece of old furniture.36 5 An important
objective of this section is to make punishable acts which are harmful
not only because they may result in a misappropriation from the one
who relies on the falsity, but because they damage the purported author
of the falsity. Thus one who falsely makes a membership card in a labor
union may be misappropriating the reputation or standing of the labor
union. The interests of such organizations and other possessors of dis-
tinctive names and labels is deemed worthy of this protection of the
criminal law.
943.39 FRAUDULENT WRITINGS
This section embodies a restatement of four prior statutes.3 6 6 The
"intent to injure or defraud" specified as an element of the crime is
used in the same sense as in the forgery section.3 6 7 Moreover, the actor
must know that the writing is in fact false. One who is convicted for
theft under section 943.20 may, because of false pretenses involving
reliance upon a fraudulent writing specified here, also commit a viola-
tion of this section.
943.40 FRAUDULENT DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN WRITINGS
This section restates the provisions of two prior statutes.3 " Once
again the key element is the "intent to defraud" which is of the same
kind as set forth in the forgery statute. Unaccompanied by such intent
the destruction of many of the instruments within the forgery statute
would not accomplish a misappropriation of another's property in-
terest.
36 9
365 Vol. 5, 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 131, comments to Proposed Code §343.32.
The Criminal Code replaced Wis. STAT. §343.561 (1953) Forgery of archaeo-
logical objects.
366 WIs. STAT. §343.25 (1953) Obtaining money by false pretenses; penalty. Sub-
section 37 of 943.39 relates to covering "any person who shall designedly, by
any false pretenses or by any privy or false token and with intent to defraud
... shall obtain . . . the signature of any person to any written instrument,
the false making whereof would be punishable as forgery...."
WIS. STAT. §343.30 (1953) False protest is covered by subsection (1)
943.39.
Wis. STAT. §343.37 (1953) Corporation officers; frauds by, penalty. Subsection
(2) of 943.39 is a restatement of part of this section. The new subsection is
restricted in scope because it is only a restatement.
Wis. STAT. §343.406 (1953) Fraudulent statements to procure insurance bene-
fits, is covered by subsection (1) of 943.39.
367 See comments to Proposed Code §343.33, 1953 LEG. COUNCIL REP. 133.
368 Wis. STAT. §343.37 (1953) Corporation officers; frauds by; penalty. Subsec-
tion (1) of 943.40 is a substantial restatement of a provision in this statute
except that it is not limited to directors, officers or managers of the corpora-
tion. Wis. STAT. §343.64 (1953) Erasing writing, is restated in subsection (2)
of 943A0.
369 See MODEL PENAL CODE §2232 (Tent. Draft No. 11), which would penalize
only the destruction with an intent to deceive or injure of any "will, deed,
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CONCLUSION
The criminal statutes dealing with misappropriation reflect the
draftsmen's belief that every fraud or conversion should not be deemed
criminal. They do not, however, mean that the legislature has run the
gamut of criminality. Other actions may be deemed so serious as to
require the proscription of the criminal law. The disclosures during 1959
and 1960 of the rigging of various television quiz shows prompted public
indignation, but what crime the producers or participants committed
has been difficult to determine, unless they committed crimes such as
perjury before an investigating grand jury, or violated Federal statutes
pertaining to interstate communicationY.3 7  The need for careful study
of this kind of problem is obvious and is illustrative of the changing
conditions with which the criminal law must deal.3 7 1
mortgage, security instrument or other writing for which the law provides
public recording."
370 108 U. PA. L. REv. 868 (1960). The Model Penal Code suggests a special
statute (or "rigging publicly exhibited contests,"), §223.9, (Tent. Draft No.
11).
371 For an interesting survey of statutes dealing with the modem problems of
corruption see Control of Nongovernrnental Corruption by Criminal Legisla-
tion, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848 (1960).
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